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"It was little the disposition of English lawyers," wrote Pro-
fessor Gray in commenting upon the meagerness of the con-
sideration given in English Law to determinable fees, "to trouble
themselves about questions which did not come up practically." 1
The same thing could even more truly be said of American law-
yers. If determinable fees and rights of reverter dependent
upon them were of no more frequent occurrence in the United
States than in England, there would certainly be no sufficient rea-
son for giving further time to their discussion.2 But such is
not the case. American courts have been frequently called upon
to determine the nature and validity of such estates,3 and the
I GRAY, RuLn AGAINST PERM UITIES (3d ed. 1915) § 779.
2 This paper is supplementary to an article by the author entitled The
Quest for Tenure in the United States (1924) 33 YALE LAW JOURNm, 248.
Since the publication of the first edition of GRAY, RuIm AGINST Pn-
Pnrurnms (1886) there has been much discussion of determinable fees. The
most notable contribution is that of Professor R. R. B. Powell, whose able
and scholarly article, Determinable Fees (1923) 23 CoL. L. REv. 207, pre-
sents the most complete and accurate survey of the authorities yet published.
Mr. J. M. Zane's Determinable Fees in American Jurisdictions (1904) 17
HARv. L. REV. 297, is also interesting and valuable.
3 The cases are collected with comments by Powell, op. cit. supra note 2.
Later cases are Brill v. Lynn, 207 Ky. 757, 270 S. W. 20 (1925) and Kim-
brell v. Parmer, 202 Ky. 686, 261 S .W. 11 (1924) holding that a provision
in a deed in fee that the land should revert to the grantor in case the
grantee died without children, created a possibility of reverter in the
grantor which could be released by him to the tenant in possession. Similar
interests retained by grantors or testators were treated as valid reverters
in Mosely v. Pattillo, 134 S. E. 49 (Ga. 1926); Hopkins v. Vance, 159 Ga.
309, 125 S. E. 592 (1924) ; Alexander v. Fleming, 190 N. C. 815, 130 S. E.
867 (1925). In Stubbs v. Abel, 114 Or. 610, 233 Pac. 852 (1925) a devise
in fee to A and B with a proviso that land should revert to the testator's
estate if both died before attaining the age of thirty, was held to create
a valid determinable fee.
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cases involving them in new and unexpected relationships ap-
pear to be increasing in number and importance. This peculiar
fact is probably due to the sense of rapid change felt in a new
country, even in land uses to be expected, causing grantors and
testators to anticipate that the purposes and uses for which gifts
of land are made may not persist in perpetuity. But whatever
the reason, it is clearly desirable that American lawyers should
come to a more satisfactory understanding of the true nature
of rights of reverter than is now possessed.
Francis Williams Sanders, of Lincoln's Inn, barrister, pub-
lished the first edition of his work on Uses and Trusts in 1791,
the third in 1813. Thereafter he had to prepare an opinion in-
volving a determinable fee. In the preparation of this opinion
he made a discovery which he subsequently described thus, in
the fourth edition of his book, published in 1824: 4
"Before the statute of quia emptores (18 Edw. 1,) an estate
might have been granted to A. B. and his heirs, so long as C. D.
and his issue should live, or so long as C. D. and his heirs should
be tenants of the manor of Dale; and upon C. D.'s ceasing to
have issue, or to be tenant of the manor of Dale, the estate re-
Yarbrough v. Yarbrough, 151 Tenn. 221, 269 S. W. 36 (1924) is an un-
usually well considered case. There was a grant to trustees to hold only
so long as used for a church site with a gift over in case of disuser. The
gift over was held void for remoteness, and the resulting possibility of
reverter, remaining in the grantor's heirs, despite an inoperative attempt
to assign it, was held valid and enforceable. Under somewhat similar
facts, it was held in Halpin v. Rural Agr'l School Dist. No. 9, 224 Mich.
308, 194 N. W. 1005 (1923) that an attempt to assign the possibility of
reverter extinguished it. In South Kingstown v. Wakefield Trust Co., 134
Atl. 815 (R. I. 1926) and Bristol Baptist Church v. Conn. Baptist Conven-
tion, 98 Conn. 677, 120 Atl. 497 (1923) where the gifts were restricted
to similar charitable uses, but without express provision for reverter in
ease of disuser, the charitable trust was preserved and enforced cy pres
against the heir of the grantor claiming a reverter. In First Reformed
Dutch Church v. Croswell, 210 App. Div. 294, 206 N. Y. Supp. 132 (3d
Dept. 1924), appeal dismissed, 239 N. Y. 625, 147 N. E. 222 (1925) it was
held that upon condemnation by eminent domain of land conveyed to be
held only so long as used as a site for a meeting house, the heirs of the
grantor are entitled to no part of the compensation awarded. See notes
in (1925) 38 HARV. L. REV. 981; (1925) 34 YALE LA w JOURNAL, 444; (1925)
10 CORN. L. Q. 399; (1925) 25 CoL. L. REV. 101. In MlcGahan v. MeGahan,
151 N. E. 627 (Ind. App. 1926) the court went quite out of its way to hold
that a conveyance to B (wife) for a consideration of "$10,000 and for a
further consideration that at the death of B, the above described land shall
revert back" to the grantor, created a determinable fee in B which became
absolute in B when she survived the grantor. See criticism in (1926) 21
ILL. L. REv. 387.
4 SANDERS, USES AND TRUSTS (4th ed. 1824) 200. In a foot-note we are
told, "The following observations are extracted from an opinion prepared by
the author, and which was subsequently well considered by two gentlemen
of eminence at the bar, and signed by them."
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verted to the donor, not as a condition broken, of which the
donor, or his heir, might take advantage by entry; but as a
principle of tenure, in the nature of an escheat upon the death
of a tenant in fee-simple without heirs general. But the statute
of quia einptores destroys the immediate tenure between the
donor and donee, in cases where the fee is granted; and conse-
quently there can now be no reverter, or any estate or possibility
of a reversion remaining in the donor after an estalte in fee
granted by him. This conclusion directly follows from the doc-
trine of tenures, and the effect of the statute of qzdat cnptorCs
upon that doctrine. The proposition does not require the aid
of decided cases; but the passage in 2 And. 138,5 contains an ac-
curate exposition of the law upon this subject."
The secret thus discovered by Sanders had slept peacefully for
five and a quarter centuries, not even suspected by the succes-
sive generations of real estate experts who lived during that
period, including Littleton, Coke, Blackstone and Preston. It is
true that certain comments made by Vavasour, J., in 1498,G and
by Sir Edmund Anderson, Chief Justice of the Court of Com-
mon Pleas, in 15797 might, if standing alone, be interpreted as
indicating opinions that determinable fees could not be created,
yet there can be little question that up to Sanders' time the
validity of determinable fees, if properly created, was generally
taken for granted by members of the legal profession.3  Cer-
tainly no one of the long line of judges and writers prior to
Sanders' time even intimated that their validity was affected by
the Statute Quia Emptores. Even though it be admitted that
up to Sanders' time there was no case puffing the validity of a
determinable fee in issue, that fact may well be regarded as evi-
5 Christopher Corbet's Case, 2 And. 134, at 138 (1579). Sanders quotes
from Chief Justice Anderson's opinion the following dictum: "If land be
given to A. and his heirs, so long as J. S. has heirs of his body, the
donee has fee, and may alien it. 13 Hen. 7; 11 Hen. 7; 21 Hen. 6, fol. 37;
and says the law seems to be plain in it; and cites 11 Ass. 8, where the
S. C. is put and held as before; and that there if the land be given to one
and his heirs, so long as J. S. and his heirs shall enjoy the manor of D.,
those words (so long) are entirely void and idle, and do not abridge the
estate."
Sanders corrects the citations here given to read 13 Hen. VII, Easter
Term, f. 24; 11 Hen. VII, f. 6, pl. 25; 21 Hen. VI, Hil. Term, f. 33, pl. 21.
But only the first reference is material and in that the supporting dictum
by Vavasour, J., is immediately contradicted by Townshend, J.
613 Hen. VII, Easter Term, f. 24; see supra note 5.
7In Christopher Corbet's Case, supra note 5. The dictum in this case
is quoted supra note 5. Professor Powell has shown clearly that it is not
entitled to the weight given it by Sanders and Gray. See Powell, op. cit.
supra note 2, at 215.
8 See 1 PRESTON, ESTATES (Am. ed. 1828, taken from 2d Eng. ed. 1820)
*430 et seq. Throughout this extensive discussion by the greatest con-
veyancer of his generation, there is no reference to the statute Quia
Emptores, nor any doubt expressed as to the validity of the estate.
YALE LAW JOURNAL
dence of the general acquiescence in its validity, as well as of the
relative unimportance of the estate among English land titles.
The publication of Sanders' discovery does not seem to have
attracted much attention from the profession. The third report
of the Commissioners on Real Property, published in 1832, cas-
ually but expressly adopted Sanders' theory, saying that "the
statute of Quia Emptores, by destroying the tenure between the
donor and donee, in cases where the fee was granted subse-
quently to the statute, put an end to any right of reverter in
such grants." 9 It was accepted incidentally by Marsden II and
fully approved by Leake, 1 but ignored by Hayes.12 In 1865, Sir
John Romilly, M. R., without reference to the Statute Quia Emp-
tores, held that a devise to trustees to hold during the life of A
and until the debts and legacies of the testator were paid, was a
valid determinable fee.13 There is nothing to indicate that Sand-
ers' new discovery was even brought to the attention of the
court. It is certainly not referred to in the arguments of coun-
sel as reported. In 1873 the same will came up for construction
before Sir George Jessel, M. R., who said that he regarded the
interpretation of the will given by Sir John Romilly as unten-
able, and that "there is not any authority to be found for any
such determinable fee." '14 The Master of the Rolls did not cite
Sanders or make any reference to the Statute Quia Emptores,
nor did counsel in arguments. There is nothing in the opinion
to indicate that the learned judge's condemnation went beyond
'any such" determinable fee as was alleged in the peculiar case
before him.15 Neither do the early American cases give any
indication, that the profession on this side the water had any
knowledge of Sanders' discovery, or suspected that the Statute
Quia Emptores had anything to do with determinable fees. Nei-
ther Kent nor Washburn makes any reference to the matter.
But in 1886 an American champion of Sanders came into the
arena, and came with enthusiasm. In that year Professor John
Chipman Gray published the first edition of his now classic work,
The Rule Against Perpetuities, in which he fully accepted Sand-
ers' view and supported it with that intellectual vigor, sound
learning and thorough review of the cases that characterize all
of his work and writings. While Sanders had naively stated
that citation of authority for his new proposition was unneces-
9 At 36. The report cites the dictum of Chief Justice Anderson referred
to supra note 5, but does not refer to Sanders.
1 'MARSDEN, PERPETuITIEs AND ACCUMULATIONS (1883) 71.
11 LEAKE, PROPERTY IN LAND (1874) 36.
12 HAYES, CONVEYANCING (5th ed. 1840).
13 Collier v. M'Bean, 34 Beav. 426 (1865).
14 Collier v. Walters, L. R. 17 Eq. 252, at 261 (1873).
15 Powell, op. cit. supra note 2. But PRESTON, op. cit. supra note 8, at
-*432 includes such an interest in his list of determinable fees.
RIGHTS OF REVERTER
sary, and then given in corrected form the abortive citations
upon which Chief Justice Anderson had rested his dictum in
Christopher Corbet's Case,' Professor Gray proceeded to ex-
amine all the authorities customarily cited in favor of the valid-
ity of determinable fees, and with that rare art in distinguish-
ing and explaining cases of which he was past master, he made
it appear that there was no English case really upholding the
validity of such estates, and only one or two American cases;
and he so emphasized the disapproving dicta in the few English
cases which discredited the estate that he quite neutralized the
chorus of approving declarations by judges and text-writers.
Immediately after the publication of Professor Gray's book,
the profession began to take notice. Sanders' all but forgotten
theory began to show distinct signs of life. *Sir Howard Elphin-
stone, in his review of the book for the LAW QUARTERLY RE-
VIEW,"7 criticised Gray's acceptance of Sanders' theory sharply,
but so incautiously Is that he fell an easy victim to Gray's re-
joinder in the same periodical.s2 Challis came to the support of
the older theory, mildly complaining that it seemed "'extremely
improbable, and even cousin-german to impossible,' . . that
a cardinal result of the Statute of Quia Emptores should be left
to be discovered by Sanders," of whose writing he had not a ver:
high opinion.!: But Challis likewise admitted that Sanders was
correct in saying that the Statute Quia Emptores, by destroying
tenure between grantor and grantee, would render determinable
fees invalid if applicable to them; but, he contended, since the
statute by its terms "extendeth but only to lands holden in fee
simple," it had no application to fees determinable, which were
not fees simple. But this theory was also too weak to stand
against Gray's reply that there was no authority to support
Challis' contention, and that the common opinion of the profes-
sion, as indicated by the authorities, was to the contrary.21 Even
Sweet, who edited the third edition of Challis, Law of Real
Property, conceded that "the weight of authority and argument
is against -Mr. Challis." 22 One American writer -! thinks Challis'
contention so weak as to be "wholly inept," but Professor Powell
16 See supra note 5.
17 (1886) 2 L. Q. REv. 394.
2
8 He attempted to escape Gray's logic, which he admitted was conclusive
"against the possibility of reserving a right of reverter to the grantor,"
by asserting that the right of reverter was in the chief lord of the fee,
a position which Gray easily showed was untenable.
19 Gray, Determinable Fees (1887) 3 L. Q. RE.v. 399. See also GRAY, op.
cit. supra note 1, §§ 775, 776.
20 Challis, Determinable Fees (1887) 3 L. Q. REv. 403, reprinted in
CHALLIS, REAL PROPERTY (3d ed. 1911) 437.
21See GRAY, op. cit. supra note 1, §§ 777, 778.
22 CHALIs, op. cit. supra note 20, 439, n.
23 Zane, op. cit. supra note 2, at 299, n. 9.
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in a recent scholarly article 24 is disposed to accept it as the best
explanation of the undeniable fact that in the 'United States, at
least, determinable fees do exist.
After the rather feeble opposition of Elphinstone and Challis
had thus broken down, one legal scholar after another joined
Gray in accepting Sanders' theory,25 so that in the third edition
of the Rule Against Perpetuities, published in 1915, it might
well be said that "most of the careful recent writers have adopted
this view." 26
But the courts have not. The question has not been squarely
presented in any English court, but judicial utterances clearly
show a tendency to abide by the older view that determinable
fees may be validly created.27  In the United States the issue
has been repeatedly 'determined and almost without exception 2
in favor of the validity of such fees.29  In only three of the
numerous American cases is reference made to Gray's conten-
tion that the statute Quia Emptores made impossible the crea-
tion of determinable fees, and in all it is denied.,,
Thus we have the unusual and interesting situation in which
a numerous company of scholars of high repute assert that
there cannot be such estates as determinable fees after the
24 Op. cit. supra note 2, at 212. Powell considerably strengthens Challis'
contention by noting that by its terms the Statute extends only to lands
"tenendis in feodo simpliciter," that is, holden in fee simply, rather than
"holden in fee simple" as Challis rendered the phrase.
25 See POLLOCK, LAND LAWS (3d ed. 1896) 226; EDWARDS, LAW OF PROP-
ERTY IN LAND (4th ed. 1904) 36; KALES, FUTURE INTERESTS (2d ed. 1920)
316; Zane, op. cit. supra note 2.
26 GRAY, op. cit. supra note 1, § 36.
27 See Lightwood's article on Real Property in 24 HALSRURY, LAWS OF
ENGLAND (1912) 170, n. (n), where Sanders' theory and Gray's argument
are considered and rejected. The author probably reflects the general
opinion of the bar when he states that Challis' list of authorities affirming
the validity of the estate is "rather curious than useful." This article
was printed under the editorial supervision of Sir Arthur Underhill. In
Leach v. Leach [1912] 2 Ch. 422, at 427, Joyce, J., said: "This limitation to
Robert of a determinable fee simple appears to me to be free from objec-
tion in every respect, notwithstanding what may have been said in any book
as to the effect of the Statute of Quia Emptores upon the creation of estates
in fee simple determinable or qualified." The strength of this state-
ment is, however, weakened by the fact that the case involved an estate
on conditional limitation rather than on special limitation.
28 The solitary case of School Committee v. Kesler, 67 N. C. 443 (1872)
which declared that determinable fees could not be created in North Caro-
lina, has been repeatedly disapproved in that state. See Hall v. Turner,
110 N. C. 292, 14 S. E. 791 (1892); Keith v. Scales, 124 N. C. 497, 514,
32 S. E. 809, 813 (1899).
29 See supra note 3.
30 First Universalist Society v. Boland, 155 Mass. 171, 29 N. E. 524
(1892); North v. Graham, 235 Ill. 178, 85 N. E. 267 (1908); Lyford v.
Laconia, 75 N. H. 220, 72 Atl. 1085 (1909).
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Statute Quia Emptores, and the courts with substantial unanim-
ity declaring them valid. In short the courts, in the United
States at least, are almost daily doing that which these real
estate experts say cannot be done. The answer is, of course,
that the recusant experts are wrong.32 But how shall we ex-
plain the seeming impossibility of the existence of these estates
under the Statute Quia Emptores that so strongly appealed to
Professor Gray? It is submitted that here we have another
and unusually striking instance of our practice of tricking our-
selves with words and phrases and of reifying our concepts
so that, imbued with a sort of objective reality, they take on
a trailing cloud of attendant misconceptions to delude us still
further. The term "tenure" has been the chief offender in this
behalf, ably aided, however, by such expressions as "reversion,"
"reversionary rights," and the fluid term "determinable fee." -2
"Tenure" is treated as a unitary concept, a thing apart, as real
and definite in its separate existence as a fence post or a chem-
ical reagent. Indeed it is treated very much as a chemical re-
agent. If you add it to a fact situation, you get one result; if
you take it away, you get quite another. This is strikingly il-
lustrated in the following statement by Gray,33 who states Sand-
ers' discovery with much greater precision than does Sanders
himself:
"Possibilities of Reverter.-These rights, as their name im-
plies, were reversionary rights; but a reversionary right implies
tenure, and the Statute Quia Emptores put an end to tenure
between the grantor of an estate in fee simple and the grantee.
Therefore, since the Statute, there can be no possibility of re-
verter remaining in the grantor upon the conveyance of a fee;
or, in other words, since the Statute, there can be no fee with
a special or collateral limitation; and the attempted imposition
of such a limitation is invalid."
This may be reduced to syllogistic form thus:
There can be no reversionary right without tenure (that is,
there must be a waiting "lord" ready to occupy the vacant fee).
A possibility of reverter after a determinable fee is a rever-
sionary right.
Therefore, no possibility of reverter without tenure.
Again:
31 Mr. Zane is still rebellious. Thus he asserts that "no court in this
country seems to have been willing to accept a line of reasoning, which is
unanswerable. This result is mainly due to the fact that for authority
upon this point the courts in this country are content with the confused
statements of Blackstone and Kent, who have followed an imposing array
of old English lawyers." Op. cit. supra note 2, at 299-4000.
32 Professor Powell, op. cit. supra note 2, collects no fewer than ten
differing legal interests to which the term has been applied.
33 GRAY, RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES (ist ed. 1886) § 31.
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There can be no possibility of reverter without tenure.
The Statute Quia Emptores abolished tenure between grantor
and grantee in fee.
Therefore there can be no possibility of reverter after the
Statute Quia Emptores.
Superficially this conclusion seems quite convincing; but fun-
damentally it is quite erroneous. The term "tenure" is at fault.
It is used in two different senses, and the conclusion is vitiated
by this duplicity. To understand this we must analyze more
carefully the concepts which we describe by the terms "tenure"
and "reversionary interest." Having determined the proper
connotation of these terms, we may, by consistent use of them,
proceed with greater hope of success in the endeavor to solve
our problem.
By "tenure' we usually mean feudal tenure; that is the form
of landholding permitted by rules developed under the feudal
system. But what of tenure in its broader sense?
The basic idea connoted by the term is the right-duty rela-
tionship that continues between grantor and grantee after the
grant of a possessory estate in land. When the interest granted
is less in time than that possessed by the grantor, that is, a par-
ticular estate such as a term of years, we have no difficulty in
finding the tenurial relationship, even under modern conditions,
between grantor and grantee. For example, the law implies a
duty on the part of the grantor to protect the grantee of such
an estate in his quiet enjoyment of the land, while the grantee
has a right to such protection. So the tenant is under a duty
to do no act prejudicial to his landlord's reversion, while the
landlord has a correlative right that the tenant refrain from
such act. This relation we ordinarily express by saying that
the tenant is estopped to deny his landlord's title. The land-
lord has a right to receive the rent to be paid and the tenant
the duty to pay it; and, most important of all, the landlord
has the right to possession at the end of the term, and the tenant
is under a duty to surrender it. The sum total of all of the
legal relations with respect to the land which the grantor re-
tains is obvious and valuable and easily recognized under the
term "reversion." But when the tenant in fee conveys in fee,
the continuing relationship between grantor and grantee, if any,
is less obvious and more difficult of analysis, and also more in-
teresting.
Before the Statute Quia Emptores, the feoffor might by the
terms of his feoffment (1) either substitute his feoffee in his
place in the feudal chain, and retire himself from the feudal
relationship; or (2) make the feoffee his own feudal dependant,
retaining for himself his previous relationship to his lord. In
the former case the feoffee holds of the feoffor's chief lord, and
RIGHTS OF REVERTER
there is no tenure between feoffor and feoffee. In the latter
case the feoffee does hold of his feoffor, who remains a significant
link in the feudal chain, and we have a situation known as sub-
infeudation.'1
Let us now attempt an analysis of the tenure that arose in
case of feoffment by way of subinfeudation. First we note
that the feoffor did not part with all his interest in the land,
although he was customarily said to convey the whole fee and
to have no reversion. In fact he retained quite a number of
significant legal relations. Some of these were implied in law
according to the manner of holding agreed upon, as, for e-x-
ample, in knight service, or in socage, while others were created
and fixed by contract. Of the former, many were so certain
in extent and so significant in the feudal scheme that they re-
ceived definite names such as homage, fealty, warranty, dis-
tress for service unperformed, escheat, wardship, marriage, re-
liefs, fines. The legal relations created by contract at the time
of feoffment varied greatly according to political and economic
need. One nearly always provided for was the services to be
rendered (reditus-rent) by the feoffee to his lord. These serv-
ices might vary from receiving a pepper-corn or "hvo Indian
arrows of those parts," to standing guard in a castle on the
Scottish border.5 Other right-duty relationships might be
created. For example, even before the Statute Quia Emptores,
the implied feudal warranty, which in early times did not bind
the heir of the feoffor without his consent, was frequently sup-
plemented by a covenant of warranty expressly binding the feof-
for's heirs and assigns. 36
It is to be noted also that some of the implied legal relations
retained by the feoffor were reversionary. By the term "rever-
sionary right" is meant a right, the enforcement of which will
at a more or less remote future time return the possession to
the feoffor. If the reverting of the possession is certain to take
place, that is, "vested," we call the interest a "reversion." If
the reverting is dependent upon one or more conditions precedent,
Z' 1 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW (1st ed. 1895) 310,
311; GRAY, op. cit. supra note 1, § 20; DIGBY, HISTRY OF THE LAW OF RlEML
PROPERTY (4th ed. 1892) 232; 3 HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW
(3d ed. 1923) 79.
35 BaAcTON, f. 35a, 35b; WILLmIs, REAL PROPERTY (22d ed. 1914) 39.
36 2 BL. COMM. *301; 3 HOLDSWORTH, op. cit. mtpra note 34, 100, 16o, 161.
"The clause of warranty becomes a normal part of the charter of feoff-
ment about the year 1200." 2 POLLOCK & DLATL,%ND, op. cit. s upa note 34,
at 311, n. 1, 660, 661. See also BRcTON, f. 37b. It is interesting to note
that not only was the implied warranty of feudal law enlarged by covenant
in the manner indicated, but it was also frequently narrowed in its opera-
tion by such express covenants. Indeed, it was quite possible for the
feoffor, though accepting homage, by express provision, to free himself
from the warranty that would otherwise be implied. BRA c ON, f. 37b, 38.
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that is, "contingent," we call the interest a "right of entry," or,
changing slightly the operative facts, a "reverter," or "possi-
bility of reverter," 37 or perhaps, merely a "reversionary right."
Among the legal relations mentioned above and implied in case
of feoffments, it is clear that "escheat" is a contingent rever-
sionary right,38 and so is the right of distress under the older
rule permitting the lord to seize the land for non-performance
of services.3 9 After a feoffment in fee these could not, of course,
be a vested reversionary right, or reversion.
Among the conventional legal relations that made up the ag-
gregate of feudal tenure, there might also be reversionary rights.
The most frequent of these was created upon feoffment to a per-
son and the heirs of his body, so construed as to set up that
strange opportunist estate, known as the fee conditional, which
was laid to rest in England by the Statute De Donis in 1285,
4
0
curiously revived in South Carolina by a statute of 1712,'41 and
recently, after its sleep of six and a half centuries, miraculously
revived in Iowa 42 and Nebraska.43 The earlier authorities, as-
suming that issue of the feoffee must certainly fail, regarded the
37 There seems nothing to support Gray's assertion that a possibility of
reverter, if allowed to exist, must be a vested interest. GRAY, op. cit. supra
note 1, § 113, n. 3. It is no more vested than any executory limitation to
a designated person after a gift in fee.
3s Gray thinks, reluctantly, that the right of escheat in real property is
a future right, but that it must be vested since it escapes the rule of
perpetuities. See GRAY, op. cit. supra note 1, §§ 115, 204, 205. The havoc
wrought in legal reasoning by the use of such a highly artificial concept
as "tenure" is well indicated by the much debated decision in Burgess v.
Wheate, 1 Eden, 177 (Ch. 1759) holding that upon the death of an owner
of an equitable fee without heirs, there is no escheat to the Crown for the
reason that no tenure exists in the case of equitable holdings. See GRAY,
op. cit. supra note 1, § 205, n. 1. This was corrected by 47 & 48 Vict. c. 71,
s. 42 (1884) by which equitable estates were made to escheat in the same
way as legal estates. It is interesting to note that escheat is abolished by
the Administration of Estates Act, 15 Geo. V. c. 23, §§ 45, 46 (1925)
which provides that if a person dies intestate leaving no persons Slualified
under the provisions of that Act to take by succession, his property, includ-
ing equitable interests, passes to the Crown as bona vacantia.
39 See 2 BL. Coimn.. *45; De Lancey v. Piepgras, 138 N. Y. 26, 39, 33 N. E.
822, 824 (1893). But in England the lord's power of distress was early re-
stricted to chattels found on the land. 1 POLLOCIC & MAITLAND, op. Cit.
supra note 34, at 334.
40 (1285) 13 Edw. I, st. 1; 1 PICKERING, STATUTES AT LARGE (1762) 163.
41 Vaughn v. Langford, 81 S. C. 282, 62 S. E. 316 (1908). See GRAY,
op. cit. supra note 1, § 14, with extensive note attached.
-2 See Kepler v. Larson, 131 Iowa, 438, 108 N. W. 1033 (1906).
43 Yates v. Yates, 104 Neb. 678, 178 N. W. 262 (1920). In Ewing v.
Nesbitt, 88 Kan. 708, 129 Pac. 1131 (1913) the court interpreting a devise
to A and the heirs of his body, called it a fee-tail, but, by mere judicial
construction, attached to the estate a power in the tenant to convey in fee
simple, strikingly like that of the tenant in fee conditional, but stripped
of the condition requiring birth of issue.
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feoffor's retained interest as a reversion, and even allowed a
remainder to be created after a fee conditional." But later it
was assumed that the feoffee's issue might never fail, thus ren-
dering the feoffor's retained interest a mere possibility of re-
verter and precluding the creation of any remainder thereafter2
But failure of issue was not the only special limitation that
the feoffor might impose upon his conveyance. The feoffment
could be to A and his heirs, while tenants of the manor of Dale.
When the manor of Dale ceased to be tenanted by A or his
heirs, the possession reverted automatically to the feoffor or
his heirs 6 The legal relation that may result in such reverting
is unquestionably one of those that make up the aggregate which
we call the "tenure" by which A held the land. It is this par-
ticular kind of legal relation with which we are immediately
concerned.
If, as so generally stated, the Statute Quia Emptores destroyed
"tenure" in the sense of precluding the creation of any tenurial
relations between grantor and grantee in fee, then beyond doubt
it prohibited the subsequent creation of such determinable fees,
and invalidated all attempts on the part of grantors to retain
a possibility of reverter, which certainly involved a tenurial
relationship.
But did the Statute Quia Emptores destroy all tenure between
feoffor and feoffee in fee? Gray is clear that it did. He so
states unequivocally: "The Statute Quiet Emptores put an end
to tenure between the feoffor of an estate in fee simple and the
feoffee." 47
If the analysis of the concept "tenure" made above is accepted,
it is equally clear that it did not put an end to all tenure, but
only that kind which we call "feudal tenure." Stating it more
precisely, the statute negatived the existence, between the par-
44"Not only could he create remainders after conditional fees, but he
could play some tricks with tenures which seem very odd to us who have
the happiness of living under Quia Emptores." Maitland, Rcmainders after
Conditional Fees (1890) 6 L. Q. REV. 22, 24, citing (at 24) the interesting
ease of Sir Thomas Weyland, Rolls of Parliament, I, 60; 3 HOLDSW oRTH, op.
cit. supra note 34, at 104. And see CHA.LIs, op. cit. supra note 20, 428
et seq.
45 Co. LrrT. *327a, *327b; CHALLIS, op. cit. supra note 20, 83-85; 2 Br.
Comm. *110, Chitty's note, citing Willion v. Berkley, Plowd. 224, 2.33
(1559). "According to the orthodoxy of a later age what the donor has
when he has created a conditional fee is not a reversion but a 'possibility
of reverter.' Whether the lawyers of 1285 had come in sight of this
subtle distinction we may doubt, without hinting for a moment that it is
not now-a-days well established." 2 POLLOCK & IMLUTLAND, op. cit. -upra
note 34, at 23.
4r6e SANDERS, UsEs AND TRUSTS (5th ed. 1844) 208; GIRAY, op. cit. cupra
note 1, § 32.
47 GRAY, op. cit. supra note 1, § 31.
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ties to a subsequent feoffment in fee, of those legal relations
theretofore implied from feudal custom. 48 This was accom-
plished by declaring that in case of such subsequent feoffment
the existing duties owed by the feoffor to his chief lord with
respect to the land should be thereafter owed by the feoffee to
the same chief lord and not to the feoffor; that is to say, the
statute substituted the feoffee for the feoffor, just as the parties
might have done if they had so desired, without the statute.
Such duties included both those implied from feudal custom, and
those especially contracted for. Since, by the very terms of
the statute, the customary duties were reserved to the feoffor's
chief lord, they could not be implied in favor of the feoffor.
But there is nothing in the statute to prevent the parties to a
feoffment made thereafter from creating by express agreement
such tenurial relationships as they may desire. This is made
clear by the terms of the statute, the most significant portions
of which are as follows: 49
1. "Forasmuch as Purchasers of Lands and Tenements of the
Fees of Great Men and other Lords, have many Times hereto-
fore entered into their Fees, to the Prejudice of the Lords, to
whom the Freeholders of such great Men have sold their Lands
and Tenements to be holden in Fee of their Feoffors, and not of
the Chief Lords of the Fees, whereby the same Chief Lords have
many Times lost their Escheats, Marriages, and Wardships of
Lands and Tenements belonging to their Fees; which Thing
seemed very hard and extream unto those Lords and other great
Men, and moreover in this case manifest Disinheritance: Our
Lord the King, in his Parliament at Westminster after Easter,
the eighteenth Year of his Reign, that is to wit, in the Quinzime
of Saint John Baptist, at the Instance of the great Men of the
Realm, granted, provided and ordained, That from henceforth it
shall be lawful for every Freeman to sell at his own Pleasure
his Lands and Tenements, or Part of them, so that the Feoffee
shall hold the same Lands or Tenements of the chief Lord of
the same Fee, by such Service and Customs, as his Feoffor held
before.
2. "And if he sell any Part of Such Lands or Tenements to
any, the Feoffee shall immediately hold it of the chief Lord; and
shall be forthwith charged with the Services, for so much as
pertaineth, or ought to pertain to the said chief Lord for the
same Parcel, according to the quantity of the Land or Tene-
ment so sold. And so in this Case the same Part of the Service
shall remain to the Lord, to be taken by the Hands of the Feoffee
48 It is interesting to note that when in 1641 the General Court of the
Plymouth and Massachusetts Bay Colonies wished to abolish feudal tenure,
they shrewdly refrained from using that shifty word, and declared that
thereafter lands should be free from the specific feudal burdens therein
enumerated. See the terms of this unusual ordinance set out in Vance,
op. cit. supra note 2, at 258, n. 54.
49 (1290) 18 Edw. I, st. 1, cc. 1, 2; c. 3 is omitted. The translation is
that given in 1 PICKERING, STATUTES AT LARGE (1762) 255.
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for the which he ought to be attendant and answerable to the
same chief Lord, according to the Quantity of the Land or
Tenement sold for the Parcel of the Service so due."
The wailing preamble of this Act sufficiently indicates its
purpose. Even at this time, the services reserved in feudal
grants, which were enforceable against the land in whomsoever's
hands it might be, were of relatively small importance; but
escheats, wardships and marriages of feudal wards brought large
profits to the overlords, of whom, even in the time of Edward I,
the king was by far the most inportant.-" In recognizing the
unrestrained power of sale in tenants in fee the statute was
merely registering the status quo. The real purpose of the en-
actment was to save to the feudal lords their escheats, ward-
ship and marriages, the value of which had been substantially
destroyed by the practice of subinfeudation. In chapter one, the
statute provides that a subsequent feoffee "shall hold the same
lands or tenements of the chief lord of the same fee, by such
service and customs as his feoffor held before." Again, in chap-
ter two, which provided for the apportionment of services in case
of the conveyance of a part of the land held by the feoffor under
a single previous feoffment, the language carefully provides that
the new feoffee shall hold of his feoffor's lord, and be answer-
able to that lord for the part so taken. Nothing in the statute
justifies Professor Gray's statement that it "enacts that in all
conveyances in fee the tenant shall not hold of the grantor but
of the grantor's lord." 5' It merely provides that the new feof-
fee shall hold by the old tenure of the feoffor's lord after the
analogy of the familiar feoffment by substitution. There is
nothing in it to prohibit the new feoffee from also holding of
his feoffor by such tenure-that is, such aggregate of legal rela-
tions-as may be agreed between them. And that is exactly
what was done. In an undated charter of feoffment probably
made shortly after the enactment of the Statute, -2 the tenendun
50 See 2 HoLDswoRTH, op. cit. supra note 34, at 348, 349; 3 ibid. SO.
Z' GRAY, op. cit. supra note 1, § 21. A similar statement is made by
HOLDSWoRTR, op. cit. supra note 34, at 36. "The Statute of Quia Emptores
prevented any person from granting lands in fee simple so that the lands
were held of him."
52 This deed is printed in Latin from the original, "with the inspection
of which we have been favored," together with the English translation
given below, in (1853) 45 LEGAL OBSERVER, 191:
"Let those present and future know, That I, Thomas Charles of Horn-
den, have given, granted, (dedi, concessi) and by this my present deed have
confirmed (confirmavi) to Ralph Hardel, citizen of London, forty acres
of land with their appurtenances, with the houses and buildings being on
the said land, of which 36 acres are in the parish of Hornden, of the fea
of the Lord Ralph of Arden, which I gained by single combat, and four
acres with their appurtenances are in the parish of Stanford at Hallinbro
of the fee of William Richer and Alaude his wife.
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clause 5 still ran to the feoffor and his heirs and the feoffee
bound himself and his heirs and assigns to render service of
one penny annually to the feoffor, his heirs and assigns as con-
sideration for the feoffor's warranty of the land, although the
provisions of the statute were fully met by a recital that the
feoffee was to render to the feoffor's lord the services due to him.
Certainly the parties to this particular feoffment would have
been much surprised if told that no tenurial relationship existed
between them. After the statute, feoffees began to insist that
feoffors should give express warranties to take the place of the
old feudal warranty no longer implied. It is probable that the
remote chief lord of the fee, especially when he was the king,
proved a very unsatisfactory vouchee. Feoffors still reserved
service of many kinds, tending more and more to take the form
of quitrents, quite familiar in our own time. The feudal right
"To have and to hold of me and my heirs to the said Ralph and his
heirs, or to whomsoever they shall choose to give, sell, or assign the said
lands with their appurtenances, and their heirs well and in peace, freely,
quietly, hereditarily, and for ever.
"Performing therefor the service due to the Lords of the fee, viz., to
Ralph of Arden and his heirs 6s. per annum, at the four terms in the
year, viz., at Easter Is. 6d., and at the Feast of St. John the Baptist Is. Gd.,
and at the Feast of St. Michael Is. 6d., and at the Feast of St. Andrew
the Apostle Is. 6d., and to our Lord the King annually 2d. for ward and
for two men to keep the said ward for one night in the proper and ac-
customed place,-and to Maude, the widow of William Richer, and her
heirs, 10d. per annum twice in the year, the half at Easter and the
half at the Feast of St. Michael. And to me, Thomas, and my heirs, Id. at
Easter for all services, rents, and secular demands appertaining to me or
my heirs.
"Aiid I the said Thomas Charles and my heirs will warrant, defend and
acquit all the aforesaid lands with their appurtenances to the said Ralph
Hardel and his heirs or their assigns, against all people, as well Christian
as Jews, for the aforesaid service.
"And of this gift, grant, warranty, defence, and acquittal, the said Ralph
has given me 36 silver marks in one sum.
"Whereof are witnesses, Simon of Dunthene, Jacob of Stanford, Thomas
of Mucking, and John his brother, William of Langton, Walter of Ware-
ham, Robert of Spring, John Malegrese, John of Coningham, Thomas
Bendeville, Walter of Hornden, clerk, and others."
In a note in the LEGAL OBSERVER, ubi supra, the absence of a date is
explained by this quotation from Co. LiTT. c. 1, §1, f. 6a:
"The date of a deed many times antiquity omitted; and the reason
thereof was, for that the limitation of prescription, or time of memory,
did often in processe of time change; and the law was then holden, that
a deed bearing date before the limited time of prescription, was not plead-
able; and therefore they made their deedes without date, to the end they
might alledge them within the time of prescription. And the date of the
deedes was commonly added in the raigne of E. 2 and E. 3, and so ever
since."
53 "The tenendum was of use before the passing of the Statute of Quiet
Emptores to state whether the purchaser was to hold of the vendor or his
lord." ELPHINSTONE, CONVEYANCING (7th ed. 1918) 127.
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to distress was of course no longer implied, but it was usually
given by contract, when the rent reserved became rent charge.
Among the rights that could by contract thus be retained by
the feoffor there might be and frequently were reversionary in-
terests. Quite frequently the feoffor or grantor reserved a power
of entry for condition broken, thus sometimes reacquiring pos-
session of the land. To such reservation the Statute Quia Emp-
tores had no application whatever." Less frequently, land was
conveyed in fee subject to a special limitation, which might by
possibility cause the land to revert to the grantor or his heirs.
Such determinable fees, and the consequent possibilities of re-
verter, may have been undesirable interests, and highly objec-
tionable as clogs upon alienation, but they were not in the least
affected by the Statute Quia Emptores. Sanders' now famous
discovery was a mistake, historically as well as pragmatically.
Z Gray, confronted with the undeniable fact that rights (powers) of
entry on breach of condition subsequent had uniformly been enforced by the
English courts even when the feoffment was in fee, thus explains the
seeming inconsistency of his contention that these shadowy interests re-
mained in the feoffor unscathed of the statute that he thought so fatal
to possibilities of reverter:
"The distinction between a right of entry for condition brohen and a
possibility of reverter is this: after the Statute, a feoffor, by the feoffment,
substituted the feoffee for himself as his lord's tenant. By entry for breach
of condition, he avoided the substitution, and placed himself in the same
position to the lord which he had formerly occupied. The right to enter
was not a reversionary right coming into effect on the termination of an
estate, but was the right to substitute the estate of the grantor for the
estate of the grantee. A possibility of reverter, on the other hand, did not
work the substitution of one estate for another, but was essentially a re-
versionary interest,-a returning of the land to the lord of whom it was
held, because the tenant's estate had determined.' GRAY, op. cit. supra
note 1, § 31.
But as already shown, rights of entry are not less reversionary in nature
than possibilities of reverter. Both are contingent reversionary interests.
More specifically, the former are powers reserved by the feoffor, by the
exercise of which, upon the happening of the contingency stated (breach of
condition) the feoffor extinguishes the legal relations of the defaulting
tenant, and creates in himself the right of possession as well as the other
legal relations that go to make up the aggregate we call a fee. See Elliott
v. Boynton [1924] 1 Ch. 236. In the case of the possibility of reverter,
the feoffor reserves a contingent right of possession which will "vest,"
if ever, only on the happening of the contingency specified in the special
limitation upon which the estate is conveyed. In the one case the feoffor's
reserved right may be said to be contingent upon two events, 'sz., breach
of condition and entry, while in the other that right is contingent upon one
event only, the falling in of the special limitation. The holding of the
English courts that rights of entry are subject to the rule of perpetuities
(In re Hollis's Hospital [1899] 2 Ch. 540) is a sufficient ackmowledgment
that the grantor retains an expectant interest in land.
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